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PROPOSALS FOR CHANGES IN THE PENNSYLVANIA
LAW OF DIVORCE
BY THE HON. JAMES F. HENNINGER *
T THE 1955 Judicial Conference of Pennsylvania,' The Honorable Vincent
A. Carroll of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Courts proposed a revision
of the Divorce Laws to include in one proceeding the questions of divorce,
property settlement and custody and support of children.
There are two other changes in our laws relating to marriage and divorce,
that ought to be considered. Both of these may seem to be relaxing our divorce
laws, but neither is proposed for that purpose.
I.
The first proposal would be for the repeal of Section 5 (h) of the Marriage
Law of August 22, 1953,2 and, if necessary, Section 9 of the Act of March 13,
1815,' which forbid the marriage of an adulterer to a paramour during the life-
time of the offended spouse.
One can see at once the poetic justice in such a provision, that insult shall
not be added to injury by permitting the offender to profit by the results of his,
or her, own sin. It is more difficult, however, to fit this penalty of disqualifica-
tion to marry the paramour into the mores of a Commonwealth which permits
remarriage to innocent and guilty alike in every other instance of divorce a
vinculo matrimonii and which permits the guilty party to a bigamous marriage
to procure an annulment.
The principle of permitting the guilty party to a void marriage to seek
annulment has indeed been carried to the extreme of permitting an adulterer to
obtain an annulment against his paramour.'
The origin of the rule is lost in the shades of mystery-that is to say that
we have had neither the time nor the patience to trace it to any source. There
is language to that effect as far back as Leviticus,' but that clearly refers to
relations while the marriage subsists. On the other hand, in Deuteronomy'
* President Judge, thirty-first judicial district of Pennsylvania.
1383 Pa. xxxii (1956).
2 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, §§ 1-5(h).
2 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 48, § 169.
4 Maurer v. Maurer, 163 Pa. Super. 264, 60 A.2d 440 (1948).
Ch. 18, v. 18.
6 Ch, 24, v. 1.
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a wife put away for some indecency is entitled to a bill of divorcement and re-
marriage.
In the Christian era, of course, there is clear language which forbids re-
marriage under any circumstances' excepting perhaps for the husband of an
adulterous wife8 or for the husband or wife of an unbeliever.
9
In Pennsylvania law, the disqualification became a general principle at the
same time that a general divorce law was enacted."0 It was not reenacted into
the Divorce Law of May 2, 1929," but was saved from repeal in the repealer
clause of that Act. It is now a part of the Marriage Law of 1953.12
I am assuming that the remarriage of persons divorced from the bond of
matrimony has become the public policy of this Commonwealth and, accepting
that proposition, our inquiry is whether there is validity to the exception.
It would be difficult to prove that the disqualification has reduced the
number of extra marital relations. Any social worker could testify that the
known prevalence of illicit relationships would indicate that it has not had
that effect.
Nor is there any great likelihood that the married person who has been
willing to commit adultery would hesitate to. continue the illicit relationship,
simply because marriage to the paramour is forbidden. Having risked a charge
of adultery, he would be unlikely to be deterred by fear of a charge of fornica-
tion. Adultery should certainly continue to be punished as a crime against
society under our criminal laws but past adultery should bear no continuing
penalty for the private satisfaction of the wronged spouse. Relaxation of the
disqualification to marry would in no way relieve a convicted adulterer from
the prescribed penalty but it would lend vitality to the command to "Go and
sin no more"." Denial of the right of remarriage surely has encouraged con-
tinuance in sin.
As for the wronged spouse, he-the masculine form is used to cover both
sexes-has it within his own power to prevent marriage of his spouse with the
paramour by refraining from obtaining a divorce. If the wife is the injured
spouse, she has the additional remedy of vindicating her rights by obtaining
7 MAir., ch. 5, v. 32; 1 COR., ch. 7, v. 11.
8 MATT., ch. 19, v. 9.
9 1 COR., ch. 7, v. 15.
10 See Act of 1785, 2 Sm. Law 343 and the Act of 1815, P.L. 150, 6 Sm. Law 286, tit. 48,
PA. STAT. ANN., § 169.
11 P.L. 1237, tit. 23, PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 to 69.
12 P.L. 1344, tit. 48, PA. STAT. ANN. § 1.
1 8 JOHN, ch. 8, V. 11.
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a divorce a mensa et thoro, which will effectually prevent her husband's remar-
riage.
When the innocent spouse, therefore, seeks his own freedom to remarry,
the disqualification on the part of the offenders to marry each other places a
blight on society without any commensurate balm to the injured spouse.
Having no graduate students at our command, the number of injured
spouses who seek solace in remarriage cannot be cited, but the percentage must
be extremely high. In fact, in some cases the remarriage is so precipitous that
one wonders whether an alert proctor or detective could not have made out a
good case of recrimination.
One cannot wax enthusiastic about the sad plight of frustrated sinners, but
we are interested in public morals and in the right of children to grow up as the
legitimate offspring of their parents. Rights of inheritance" will not compen-
sate for being the fruit of an illicit relationship.
The very language giving the right of inheritance indicates the futility of
forbidding remarriage for it relates to birth during coverture, which necessarily
implies a marriage in defiance of the law, since otherwise, without acknowl-
edgment, the child would be filius nullius.
When the law of the land does not reflect the community mores, the com-
munity usually seeks a detour about the barrier that has' been erected. Thus,
divorces are rarely brought on the grounds of adultery but rather on the
grounds of indignities to the person; this is easier to prove and is less dis-
tasteful. This course will probably be still more widely pursued since the case
of Phipps v. Phipps,"5 which recognized marital infidelity as a source of indig-
nity and repeated acts as a course of indignities.
At this point, I have some statistics from my own experience. In 23 years
on the bench, 3.5% of the cases for divorce have been based upon charges
of adultery. Yet a study of the testimony-unreliable as it may be in uncon-
tested cases-reveals that "other men" and "other women" have been the chief
cause of dissension in 47% of the cases.
It might be argued therefore that the problem is not acute. We are not
contending that there should be more charges of adultery in divorce cases, but
it stands to reason that the few offenders who have had to meet that charge
should not suffer from a disqualification from which most of their fellows
have escaped.
14 See § 9 of the Act of 1815, note 10 supra.




The bold and honest cure for this situation is to retain all other penalties
for adultery but to repeal the disqualification from marriage pur autre vie.
II.
The second inconsistency in our divorce laws lies in the persistence of a
provision that a divorce cannot be obtained from an incompetent spouse, who
is not "hopelessly insane".
This provision has a curious history. In 1905, the legislature passed an
Act18 that reads in part as follows:
"Clause A. That from and after the passage of this act, in cases where the
husband or wife is a hopeless lunatic or non compos mentis, the courts of common
pleas of this Commonwealth are invested with the authority to receive a petition
or libel for divorce; the affidavit, as now required by law to such petition for libel,
to be made by the petitioner; and the service of subpoena in divorce shall be made
as now provided, such service to be made upon the committee of such lunatic;
and all the provisions of the several acts relating to divorces shall apply to all
applications made under this act.
"Clause B. That the fact of the lunacy of the husband or wife, and such cir-
cumstances as may be sufficient to satisfy the mind of the court as to the truth of
the allegation, shall be set forth in the petition; and upon the hearing of the case
before the court, a master, or issue to be tried by jury, the question of lunacy shall
be fully established by expert testimony, together with every other matter of fact
that is affirmed by one party and denied by the other, and the same shall be heard
and investigated in the matter prescribed by the provisions of the several acts con-
cerning divorces.
"Clause C. No divorce shall be granted under this act to any petitioner or
libellant unless it be proved beyond a -reasonable doubt that the husband or wife of
the petitioner is hopelessly insane: Provided, however, That if the husband or
wife has been for ten or more years an inmate of an asylum for the insane, it shall
be conclusive proof of hopeless insanity."
Many courts believed this Act created a new cause of divorce, namely,
hopeless insanity. Rumor had it that the Act was passed for the benefit of
some prominent Pennsylvanians, but rumor has no place in these august
columns.
Divorces were granted under this supposed power until two cases, Baugh-
man v. Baughman,"' and Johnston v. Johnston,'" reached the Superior Court
of Pennsylvania, which held that the Act did not in fact create a new ground
18 Act of April 18, 1905, P.L. 211.
17 34 Pa. Super. 271, 274 (1907).
18 34 Pa. Super. 606 (1907).
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for divorce, 'but that it merely provided the procedure where divorce was
sought from an insane-the word insane had not yet become a forbidden word
-spouse.
With these decisions we have no quarrel, although we are convinced that
the legislature intended to make hopeless insanity a ground for divorce, but
used inapt language to accomplish that purpose.
The 1909 Legislature bowed to the Court's decision and, if the 1905 Legis-
lature had actually intended to establish a new ground for divorce, the 1909
Legislature abandoned that idea. Instead it passed an Act "9 validating final
decrees in divorce granted under the false supposition that hopeless insanity
had been made a ground for divorce and let the matter go at that.
Whether such validating act was necessary or whether the decrees unap-
pealed from would have stood as "the law of the case," would make an inter-
esting subject for another article, except that divorces granted fifty years ago
must by now be pretty generally moot.
When the Divorce Laws were codified in the Divorce Law of 1929, parts
of the Act of 1905 were incorporated as Sections 18, 25, 30, 45, and 53.20 When
the Procedural Rules for divorce were promulgated, Sections 25 and 30 of the
Divorce Law were suspended and Sections 18, 45, and 53 were saved from sus-
pension.
The combined legislation and decisions have left upon our books two more
exceptions to the general law of marital rights and divorce procedure. The
Act of 1905, supra, Section 1, Clause D, -provided for continued support of
the wife after a divorce a vinculo matrimonii and this provision has been con-
tinued in Section 45 of the Divorce Law of 1929.21 This is the only situation
in which that obligation survives such a divorce in Pennsylvania, since the pro-
visions for support after a divorce by the husband for cruelty and indignities
were repealed by Sec. 75 of the Divorce Law of 1929. Since the principle of
continuing support after an absolute divorce is the general rule rather than the
exception in most other jurisdictions, I do not press this point of its incon-
gruity in Pennsylvania divorce law. It is interesting to note, however, that
although divorce from an insane person can be had only on proof of hopeless
insanity, if the respondent does in fact recover, she has lost the right of sup-
port, but the divorce remains valid.2
19 Act No. 219 of May 3, 1909, P.L. 390; see also Act of May 13, 1927, P.L. 991.
20 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, §§ 18, 25, 30, 45, and 53 respectively.
21 PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 23, § 45.
22 Emerick v. Emerick, 116 Pa. Super. 241, 176 At. 509 (1935); Hickey v. Hickey, 158 Pa.
Super. 511, 45 A.2d 380 (1946).
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What is more serious is that an injured spouse with a perfectly good cause
for divorce against an incompetent spouse is debarred from establishing his
rights unless the spouse is "hopelessly insane". That this is the law cannot
be doubted in the light of Schwarzkopf v. Schwarzkopf,2" and Boyer v. Boyer.2"
This problem must be distinguished from several others. I am not
contending that insanity should be made a cause for divorce. I have no quar-
rel with the decisions which disregard as indignities, acts prompted by the
spouse's mental illness, 5 or which hold that an insane spouse cannot persist
in desertion.2" I agree that the rights of an incompetent spouse should be
zealously guarded in any legal proceeding, for divorce or otherwise.
However, there is no good reason why, if a good cause of divorce has
arisen, the later incompetency of the offending spouse should stand in the way
of the innocent and injured spouse who seeks to assert his legal rights. Section
18 of the Divorce Law of 1929 would indicate legislative provision that a
respondent's insanity or state of being non compos mentis should not bar a
divorce proceeding, but Section 53 overrules any such implication unless there
is hopeless insanity. The result of the present situation is that a person with
a good cause of action, but with a spouse with a curable mental illness or with
one about which science is unable to make a pessimistic prognosis, must be
denied rights granted to all others with an equally good cause of action in other
fields.
Any insane person is fully protected by Sections 18 and 45 of the Divorce
Law of 1929 and by Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 2051 to 2075 relat-
ing to incompetents as parties. If, as was held in Baughman v. Baughman,"
Section 53 of the Divorce Law of 1929 is purely procedural, it could be sus-
pended by a Procedural Rule. A more certain method of solution would be
by repeal of that section.
23 176 Pa. Super. 441, 107 A.2d 610 (1954).
24 163 Pa. Super. 520, 63 A.2d 495 (1949).
25 Baines v. Baines, 181 Pa. Super. 427, 124 A.2d 646 (1956).
2 8 Kisner v. Kisner, 69 Pa. D. & C. 67 (1950).
27 Supra note 17.
[VOL. 61
